The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.
The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.
Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966
Decided: June 13, 1966
Vote: 5-4
Majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.
Dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices Stewart and White.
Dissenting in part opinion written by Justice Clark.
Miranda v. Arizona: After Miranda’s conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, the State of Arizona retried him. At the second trial, Miranda’s confession was not introduced into evidence. Miranda was once again convicted and sentenced to 20-30 years in prison.
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